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Abstract
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing
with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty
and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given
model distribution.
We characterize the optimal pricing policy under two distinct, but related, decision
criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin expected utility and (ii) minimax expected
regret. The resulting optimal pricing policy under either criterion yields a robust policy
to the model uncertainty.
While the classic monopoly policy and the maximin criterion yield a single determin-
istic price, minimax regret always prescribes a random pricing policy, or equivalently,
a multi-item menu policy. Distinct implications of how a monopolist responds to an
increase in uncertainty emerge under the two criteria.
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11 Introduction
In the past decade, the theory of mechanism design has found increasingly widespread
applications in the real world, favored partly by the growth of the electronic marketplace
and trading on the internet. Many trading platforms, such as auctions and exchanges,
implement key insights of the theoretical literature. With an increase in the use of optimal
design models, the robustness of these mechanisms with respect to the model speci￿cation
becomes an important issue. In this paper, we investigate a robust version of the classic
monopoly problem of selling a product under incomplete information. Optimal monopoly
pricing is the most elementary instance of a pro￿t maximizing problem in mechanism design
with incomplete information.
We investigate the robustness of the optimal selling policy by enriching the standard
model to account for model uncertainty. In the classic model, the valuation of the buyer
is drawn from a given prior distribution. In contrast, in the robust version, the seller only
knows that the true distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. The
size of the neighborhood represents the extent of the model uncertainty faced by the seller.
We consider the neighborhoods induced by the Prohorov metric which is the standard
metric in robust statistical decision theory (see the Huber (1981) and Hampel, Ronchetti,
Rousseeuw, and Stahel (1986)). In the context of our demand model, the Prohorov metric
gives a literal description of the two relevant sources of model uncertainty. With a large
probability, the seller could misperceive the willingness to pay by a small margin, and with
a small probability, the seller could be mistaken about the market parameters by a large
margin. The Prohorov metric incorporates exactly these two di⁄erent types of deviations,
allowing both for a large probability of small errors and a small probability of large errors.
The optimal pricing policy of the seller in the presence of model uncertainty is an instance
of decision-making with multiple priors. We therefore build on the axiomatic decision
theory with multiple priors and obtain interesting new insights for monopoly pricing. The
methodological insight is that robustness can be guaranteed by considering decision making
under multiple priors. The strategic insight is that we are able predict how an increase in
uncertainty e⁄ects the pricing policy by using exclusively the data of the model distribution.
2There are two leading approaches to incorporate multiple priors into axiomatic decision
making: maximin utility and minimax regret. The maximin utility approach with multiple
priors is due to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Here, the decision maker evaluates each ac-
tion by its minimum expected utility across all priors. The decision maker selects the action
that maximizes the minimum expected utility. The minimax regret approach, originating
in Savage (1951), was axiomatized by Milnor (1954) and recently adapted to multiple priors
by Hayashi (2008) and Stoye (2008). Here, the decision maker evaluates foregone oppor-
tunities using regret and chooses an action that minimizes the maximum expected regret
among the set of priors.
From an axiomatic perspective, the maximin utility and minimax regret criteria rep-
resent di⁄erent departures from the standard model of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) by
allowing for multiple priors. The maximin utility criterion emerges by giving up the inde-
pendence axiom and replacing it with the weaker certainty independence axiom and adding
a convexity axiom. The minimax regret criterion emerges by maintaining the certainty inde-
pendence axiom but relaxing the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, to allow
the choice to be menu dependent. A convexity axiom and a version of the betweenness
axiom complete the characterization. Both the maximin utility and the minimax regret
criteria can interpreted as re￿nements of subjective expected utility theory.
The analysis of the optimal pricing under the two decision criteria reveals that either
criterion leads to a family of robust policies in the following sense. We say that a candidate
family of policies, indexed by the size of the uncertainty, is robust, if for any demand
su¢ ciently close to the model distribution, the di⁄erence between the expected pro￿t under
the optimal policy for this demand and the expected pro￿t under the candidate policy is
arbitrarily small. While the optimal policies under maximin utility and minimax regret
share the robustness property, the response to the uncertainty leads to distinct qualitative
features.
The pricing policy of the seller is obtained as the equilibrium strategy of a zero-sum game
between the seller and adversarial nature. The strategy by nature selects the least favorable
demand given the objective of the seller. Under maximin utility the seller is worse o⁄ when
valuations are lower. The least favorable demand thus maximizes the weight on the lowest
3valuations subject to the restriction that the selected distribution is in the neighborhood
of the model distribution. In particular, as we increase the uncertainty represented by an
increase in the size of the neighborhood, the buyers valuations as determined by the least
favorable demand are lower in the sense of ￿rst order stochastic dominance. In consequence
the best response of the seller always consists in lowering her price.
When we analyze the behavior under regret minimization, the optimal pricing policy is
still determined by a zero-sum game between the seller and nature. The notion of regret
modi￿es the trade-o⁄ for the seller and for nature. The regret of the seller is the di⁄erence
between the actual valuation of a buyer for the object and the actual pro￿t obtained by
the seller. The regret of the seller can therefore be positive for two reasons: (i) a buyer
has a low valuation relative to the price and hence does not purchase the object, or (ii) he
has a high valuation relative to the price and hence the seller could have obtained a higher
pro￿t. In the equilibrium of the zero-sum game, the optimal pricing policy of the seller has
to resolve the con￿ ict between the regret which arises with low prices against the regret
associated with high prices. If the seller o⁄ers a low price, nature can cause regret with
a distribution which puts substantial probability on high valuation buyers. On the other
hand, if the seller o⁄ers a high price, nature can cause regret with a distribution which puts
substantial probability at valuations just below the o⁄ered price. It then becomes evident
that a single price will always expose the seller to substantial regret. Consequently, the
seller can decrease her exposure by o⁄ering many prices. This can either be achieved by
a probabilistic price or, alternatively, by a menu of prices. With a probabilistic price, the
seller diminishes the likelihood that nature will be able to cause large regret. Equivalently,
the seller can o⁄er a menu of prices and quantities. The quantity element in the menu
can either represent the quantity of a divisible object or the probability of obtaining an
indivisible object.
We provide additional intuition by contrasting the pricing policy under regret to the
standard pro￿t maximizing policy. An optimal policy for a given distribution of valuations
is always to o⁄er the entire object at a ￿xed price (a classic result by Harris and Raviv
(1981) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)). In contrast, here the policy will o⁄er many prices
(with varying quantities). With a single price, the risk of missing a trade at a valuation just
4below the given price is substantial. On the other hand, if the seller were simply to lower
the price, she would miss the chance of extracting pro￿t from higher valuation customers.
She resolves this con￿ ict by o⁄ering smaller trades at lower prices to the low valuation
customers. The size of the trade is simply the probability by which a trade is o⁄ered or
the quantity o⁄ered at a given price. In the game against nature, the seller will have to
be indi⁄erent between o⁄ering small and large trades. In terms of the virtual utility, the
key notion in optimal mechanisms, this requires that the seller will receive zero virtual
utility over a range of valuations. The resulting conditions on the distribution of valuations
determine the least favorable demand. Importantly, an increase in uncertainty may now
lead to an increase in the expected price. In the special case of a linear model distribution,
we ￿nd that the expected price increases if the optimal price for the model distribution is
low and decreases if the optimal price for the model distribution is high.
We conclude the introduction with a brief discussion of the directly related literature.
The basic ideas of robust decision making (see De￿nition 1) were ￿rst formalized in the
context of statistical inference, in particular, with respect to the classic Neyman-Pearson
hypothesis testing framework. The statistical problem is to distinguish between two known
distributions on the basis of a sample. The model misspeci￿cation and consequent concern
for robustness come from the fact that each of the two distributions might be misspeci￿ed.
Huber (1964), (1965) ￿rst formalized robust estimation as the solution to a minimax problem
and an associated zero-sum game. A recent contribution by Prasad (2003) employs this
notion of robustness to the optimal policy without uncertainty, where it is referred to as
￿-robustness, and demonstrates the non-robustness of some economic models. In particular,
he shows that the pro￿t maximizing price in the optimal monopoly problem considered here
is not robust to model misspeci￿cation. The non-robustness is demonstrated by a simple
example. Suppose the model distribution is a Dirac distribution, which put probability
one on a particular valuation v. Then the optimal monopoly price p is equal to v. This
policy is not robust to model misspeci￿cation, because if the true model puts probability
one on a value arbitrarily close, but strictly below v, then the resulting revenue is 0 rather
than v. One of the objectives of this paper to identify robust policies, but not necessarily
the optimal policy without uncertainty, that do not su⁄er from such discontinuity in the
5pro￿ts.1
A recent paper by Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape (2006) determines the optimal auction
in the presence of an uncertainty averse seller and uncertainty averse bidders. Lopomo,
Rigotti, and Shannon (2006) consider a general mechanism design setting when the agents,
but not the principal, have incomplete preferences due to Knightian uncertainty. In related
work, Bergemann and Schlag (2008) consider the optimal monopoly problem under regret
without any priors. There, the analysis is concerned with optimal policies in the absence
of information rather than robustness and responsiveness to uncertainty as in the current
contribution. The notion of regret was investigated in mechanism design by Linhart and
Radner (1989) in the context of bilateral trade as well as by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989)
and Selten (1989) in the context of auctions. Recently, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2007) and Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) present experimental evidence indicating concern
for regret in ￿rst price auctions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model,
the notion of robustness and the neighborhoods. In Section 3, we characterize the pricing
policy under the maximin utility criterion. In Section 4, we characterize the pricing policy
under the minimax regret criterion. We show that the resulting policies are robust under
either criterion. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of some open issues. The appendix
collects auxiliary results and the proofs.
2 Model
2.1 Monopoly
The seller faces a single potential buyer with value v 2 [0;1] for a unit of the object. The
value v is private information to the buyer and unknown to the seller. The buyer wishes
to buy at most one unit of the object. The marginal cost of production is constant and
normalized to zero. The net utility of the buyer with value v of purchasing a unit of the
1There is also a rapidly growing literature on robust decision making in macroeconomics, see Hansen and
Sargent (2007) for a comprehensive introduction, that uses related notions of robustness for maximizing the
minimum utility in the context of intertemporal decision-making.
6object at price p is v ￿ p. The pro￿t of selling a unit of the object at a deterministic price
p 2 R+ if the valuation of the buyer is v is:
￿ (p;v) , pIfv￿pg;





0; if v < p;
1; if v ￿ p:





Given the risk neutrality of the buyer and the seller, a random pricing policy ￿ by the
seller can alternatively by represented as a menu policy (q;t(q)) where q is the probability
that the buyer receives the object and t(q) is the tari⁄that the buyer pays for the probability
q. Given the random pricing policy ￿, we can de￿ne for every p 2 suppf￿g :
q , ￿(p); (1)





In the menu interpretation, q is either the probability of receiving the object if the object
is indivisible or the quantity if the object is divisible.
In the classic monopoly problem with incomplete information, the seller maximizes the
expected pro￿t for a given prior F over valuations. In the robust version, we assume that
the seller faces uncertainty (or ambiguity) in the sense of Ellsberg (1961). The uncertainty
is represented by a set of possible distributions. We ￿rst introduce the basic notation for the
classic monopoly model and then de￿ne the model with uncertainty. For given a distribution




7We note that the demand generated by the distribution F can either represent a single large
buyer or many small buyers. In this paper, we phrase the results in terms of a single large
buyer, but the results generalize naturally to the case of many small buyers.




A random pricing policy that maximizes the pro￿t for given distribution F is denoted by
￿￿ (F):
￿￿ (F) 2 argmax
￿2￿R+
￿ (￿;F).
A well-known result by Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) states that for every distribution F,
there exists a deterministic price p￿ (F) that maximizes pro￿ts, so:




We assume that the seller faces uncertainty (or ambiguity) in the sense of Ellsberg (1961).
The uncertainty is represented by a set of possible distributions, where the set is described
by a model distribution F0 and includes all distributions in a neighborhood of size " of
the model distribution F0. The magnitude of the uncertainty is thus quanti￿ed by the size
of the neighborhood around the model distribution. Given the model distribution F0 we
denote by p0 a pro￿t maximizing price at F0:
p0 , p￿ (F0):
For the remainder of the paper we shall assume that at the model distribution F0: (i) p0 is
the unique maximizer of the pro￿t function ￿ (p;F0) and (ii) the density f0 is continuously
di⁄erentiable near p0. These regularity assumptions enable us to use the implicit function
theorem for the local analysis.
We consider two di⁄erent decision criteria that allow for multiple priors: maximin utility
and minimax regret. In either approach, the unknown state of the world is identi￿ed with
the value v of the buyer.
8Neighborhoods Given the model distribution F0, we de￿ne the " neighborhoods, denoted
by P" (F0), through the Prohorov metric:
P" (F0) = fF jF (A) ￿ F0 (A") + "; 8 measurable A ￿ [0;1]g, (3)
where the set A" denotes the closed " neighborhood of any measurable set A.2 Formally,










where d(x;y) = jx ￿ yj is the distance on the real line. The Prohorov metric has evidently
two components. The additive term " in (3) allows for a small probability of large changes
in the valuations relative to the model distribution whereas the larger set A" permits large
probabilities of small changes in the valuations. The Prohorov metric is a metric for weak
convergence of probability measures.
Maximin Utility Under maximin utility, the seller maximizes the minimum utility, where






Accordingly, we say that ￿m attains maximin utility. We refer to Fm as a least favorable






The least favorable demand Fm minimizes pro￿ts across all pro￿t maximizing pricing poli-
cies.3
2See Dudley (2002) for the de￿nition of the Prohorov metric and the link to weak convergence and Huber
(1981) and Hampel, Ronchetti, Rousseeuw, and Stahel (1986) for its application in robust statistics.
3Klibano⁄, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) propose a related and smooth model of ambiguity aversion by
enriching the multiple prior model with a belief ￿ over distributions and with an increasing transformation
’ representing ambiguity aversion. The additional elements, belief ￿ and ambiguity index ’, render the
analysis of multiple priors richer but also substantially more complex. In addition, the one-dimensional
representation of ambiguity in terms of the size of the neighborhood is not available anymore.
9Minimax Regret The regret of the monopolist at a given price p and valuation v of a
buyer is de￿ned as:
r(p;v) , v ￿ pIfv￿pg = v ￿ ￿ (p;v); (4)
The regret of the monopolist charging price p facing a buyer with value v is the di⁄erence
between (i) the pro￿t the monopolist could make if she were to know the value v of the
buyer before setting her price and (ii) the pro￿t she makes without this information. The
regret is non-negative and can only vanish if p = v. The regret of the monopolist is strictly
positive in either of two cases: (i) the value v exceeds the price p, the indicator function
is then Ifv￿pg = 1; or (ii) the value v is below the price p, the indicator function is then
Ifv￿pg = 0.









Thus, the probabilistic price ￿ is pro￿t maximizing at F if and only if ￿ minimizes (ex-
pected) regret when facing F: The pricing policy ￿r 2 ￿R+ attains minimax regret if it




















Thus, a least favorable demand maximizes the regret of a pro￿t maximizing seller who
knows the true demand. It should be pointed out that while this regret criterion seems to
relate to foregone opportunities when the information is revealed ex post, this particular
interpretation is solely an additional feature of the minimax regret model. In particular,
the decision maker does not need additional information to become available ex post. As
in the case of the maximin utility criterion of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the minimax
10regret criterion in Hayashi (2008) and Stoye (2008) is completely characterized by a set of
axioms.4
The notion of regret naturally extends to the case of many buyers as follows. The
regret of the seller facing n buyers is equal to the sum of the regret accrued over n buyers
and n, possibly distinct, prices. While the seller is thus allowed to o⁄er a di⁄erent price
to each buyer, the additivity of the regret implies that we can con￿ne attention to price
(distributions) which are identical across buyers.
2.3 Robust Pricing
For a given model distribution F0, we de￿ne a robust family of random pricing policies,
f￿"g">0, which are indexed by the size of the neighborhood " as follows.
De￿nition 1 (Robust Pricing)
A family of pricing policies f￿"g">0 is called robust if, for each ￿ > 0, there is " > 0 such
that:
F 2 P" (F0) ) ￿ (￿￿ (F);F) ￿ ￿ (￿";F) < ￿:
The above notion presents a formal criterion of robust decision making in the spirit
of the statistical decision literature pioneered by Huber (1964). It requires that for every,
arbitrarily small, upper bound ￿, on the di⁄erence in the pro￿ts between the optimal policy
￿￿ (F) without uncertainty and an element of robust family of policies f￿"g, we can ￿nd
a su¢ ciently small neighborhood " so that the robust policy ￿" meets the upper bound ￿
for all distributions in the neighborhood. Each member ￿" in the robust family f￿"g">0 is
allowed to depend on the size " of the neighborhood. A natural and ideal candidate for a
robust policy is the optimal policy ￿￿ (F) itself. In other words, we would require that for
each ￿ > 0, there is " > 0 such that:
F 2 P" (F0) ) ￿ (￿￿ (F);F) ￿ ￿ (￿￿ (F0);F) < ￿: (6)
4In particular, the axiomatic approach to minimax regret is distinct from the ex-post measure of regret
due to Hannan (1957) in the context of repeated games or from the more behavioral approaches to regret
o⁄ered by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982).
11This notion of robustness, applied directly to the optimal policy ￿￿ (F), constitutes the
de￿nition of ￿ robustness in Prasad (2003) and his earlier mentioned example of the Dirac
distribution shows that the optimal policy ￿￿ (F) is in general not robust.5 For a given model
distribution F0, there are potentially many robust families of pricing rules. Our objective is
to select among these rules by considering decision making under multiple priors and then
to show that the resulting pricing rules are robust in the above sense of statistical decision
making.
3 Maximin Utility
We consider the problem of the monopolist who wishes to maximize the minimum pro￿t for
all distributions in the neighborhood of the model distribution F0. Following Von Neumann
(1928), the pricing rule that attains maximin utility can be viewed as the equilibrium strat-
egy in a game between the seller and adversarial nature. The seller chooses a probabilistic
price ￿ and nature chooses a demand distribution F from the set P" (F0). In this game, the
payo⁄ of the seller is the expected pro￿t while the payo⁄ of nature is the negative of the
expected pro￿t. Formally, a Nash equilibrium of this zero-sum game can be characterized
as a solution to the saddle point problem of ￿nding (￿m;Fm) that satisfy:
￿ (￿;Fm) ￿ ￿ (￿m;Fm) ￿ ￿ (￿m;F); 8￿ 2 ￿R+, 8F 2 P" (F0). (SPm)
In other words, at (￿m;Fm) the probabilistic price ￿m is pro￿t maximizing at Fm and Fm
is a pro￿t minimizing demand given ￿m.
The objective of adversarial nature is to lower the expected pro￿t of the seller. For
a given price p o⁄ered by the seller, the pro￿t minimizing demand given p is achieved by
increasing the cumulative probability of valuations strictly below p as much as possible
within the neighborhood. The pro￿t minimizing demand then minimizes the probability of
sale by the seller. Given the model distribution F0 and the size " of the neighborhood, the
5In Prasad (2003), the de￿nition of ￿ robustness evaluates the pro￿ts at the model distribution F0 rather
than at the elements F in the neighborhood P" (F0) of the model distribution F0 as in (6). This di⁄erence
is irrelevant in the case of a failure of robustness, which is the focus in Prasad (2003), due to the symmetry
property of the Prohorov distance.
12resulting distribution is uniquely determined for every p (up to a set of measure 0). The
equilibrium analysis is now simpli￿ed by the fact that the pro￿t minimizing demand does
not depend on the, possibly probabilistic, price of the seller. We obtain the least favorable
demand by shifting the probabilities as far down as possible, given the constraints imposed
by the model distribution F0 and the size " of the neighborhood.
The exact construction of the least favorable demand in the Prohorov metric is rather
transparent. Given a model demand F0 and a neighborhood size ", we shift, for every v, the
cumulative probability of the model distribution F0 at the point v +" downwards to be the
cumulative probability at the point v. In addition, we transfer the very highest valuations
with probability " to the lowest valuation, namely v = 0: This results in the distribution
Fm that is within the " neighborhood of F0, with Fm given by:
Fm (v) , minfF0 (v + ") + ";1g: (7)
The ￿rst shift represents the possibility that small changes in valuations may occur with
large probability. The second shift represents the idea of large changes occurring with a
small probability. It is easily veri￿ed Fm is a pro￿t minimizing demand for any price given
the constraint imposed by the size of the neighborhood. We illustrate the least favorable
demand Fm and the price pm that attain maximin utility below for a model distribution
with uniform density on the unit interval and a neighborhood of size " = 0:05. We visualize
the uncertainty around the model demand F0 by the grey shaded area, which represents
the smallest set that contains all cumulative distributions that lie within the Prohorov
neighborhood of the uniform distribution (see also Lemma 1 for a characterization of the
distribution functions that lie within the Prohorov neighborhood.)
Insert Figure 1: Pricing and Least Favorable Demand under Maximin Utility
Given that the pro￿t minimizing demand Fm does not depend on the o⁄ered prices,
the monopolist acts as if the demand is given by Fm. In consequence, the seller maximizes
pro￿ts at Fm by choosing a deterministic price pm where
pm , p￿ (Fm):
13Proposition 1 (Maximin Utility)
For every " > 0; there exists a pair (pm;Fm), such that pm 2 [0;1] attains maximin utility
and Fm is a least favorable demand.
An important implication of the above result is that a deterministic pricing policy pm
can always attain maximin utility. In contrast, under minimax regret a random pricing
policy will always be strictly preferred to a deterministic pricing policy.
We now ask how the optimal price will change with an increase in uncertainty. The
rate of the change in the price depends on the curvature of the pro￿t function at the model
distribution F0. By the earlier assumption of concavity, we know that the curvature is
negative and given by:
@2￿ (p0;F0)
@p2 = ￿2f0 (p0) ￿ p0f0
0 (p0) < 0:
We can directly apply the implicit function theorem to the optimal price p0 at the model
distribution F0 and obtain the following comparative static result.
Proposition 2 (Pricing under Maximin Utility)








1 ￿ f0 (p0)




Accordingly, the price that attains maximin utility responds to an increase in uncertainty
with a lower price. Marginally, this response is equal to ￿1 if the objective function is
in￿nitely concave. As the pro￿t function becomes less concave, the rate of the price change
increases as the pro￿t function of the seller becomes less sensitive to a (downward) change
in price and a more aggressive response of the seller diminishes the impact that the least
favorable demand has on the sales of the monopolist.
Consider now the pro￿ts realized by the price pm;" - which attains maximin utility
within the neighborhood P" (F0) - at a given distribution F 2 P" (F0). By construction,
these pro￿ts will be at least as high as those obtained when facing the least favorable
demand Fm. We now use the lower bound on the pro￿ts supported by Fm to show that the
optimal pro￿ts are continuous in the demand distribution F. This will imply that pro￿ts
14achieved by pm;" when facing F are close to those achieved by p￿ (F) when facing F: The
family of pricing rules that attain maximin utility thus qualify as being robust.
Proposition 3 (Robustness)
The family of pricing policies fpm;"g">0 is a robust family of pricing policies.
4 Minimax Regret
4.1 Random Pricing
Next we consider the minimax regret problem of the seller. In contrast to the case of
maximin utility, we now ￿nd that the seller chooses to o⁄er a random pricing policy. The
minimax regret strategy ￿r and the least favorable demand Fr are the equilibrium policies
of a zero-sum game. In this zero-sum game, the payo⁄ of the seller is the negative of the
regret while the payo⁄ to nature is regret itself. That is, (￿r;Fr) can be characterized as a
solution to the saddle point problem of ￿nding (￿r;Fr) that satisfy:
r(￿r;F) ￿ r(￿r;Fr) ￿ r(￿;Fr); 8￿ 2 ￿R+, 8F 2 P" (F0). (SPr)
The saddlepoint result permits us to link minimax regret behavior to payo⁄maximizing
behavior under a prior as follows. When minimax regret is derived from the equilibrium
characterization in (SPr) then any price chosen by a monopolist who minimizes maximal
regret, is at the same time a price which maximizes expected pro￿t against a particular
demand, namely, the least favorable demand. In fact, the saddle point condition requires
that ￿r is a probabilistic price that maximizes pro￿ts given Fr and Fr is a regret maximizing
demand given ￿r.6
In the equilibrium of the zero-sum game, the probabilistic price has to resolve the con￿ ict
between the regret which arises with low prices, against the regret associated with high
prices. The regret of the seller depends critically on the price o⁄ered by the seller. If
6We emphasize that we consider a simultaneous move game between the seller and nature. In this static
environment, the earlier discussed axiomatic foundations lead the decision-maker, here the seller, to be
concerned with the expected regret of the mixed pricing rule. In contrast, in a multi-stage game, one might
analyze the regret relative to a realized price to avoid time inconsistency by the decision-maker.
15she o⁄ers a low price, nature can cause regret with a distribution which puts substantial
probability on high valuation buyers. On the other hand, if she o⁄ers a high price, nature can
cause regret with a distribution which puts substantial probability at valuations just below
the o⁄ered price. It now becomes evident that a single price will always expose the seller
to substantial regret. Conversely, the regret maximizing demand will now typically depend
on the price o⁄ered by the seller. In fact, the seller can decrease her exposure by o⁄ering
many prices in form of a probabilistic price. In contrast to the maximin pro￿t, the regret
maximizing demand is the result of an equilibrium argument and cannot be constructed
independently of the strategy of the seller. We shall prove the existence of a solution to the
saddlepoint problem (SPr) and thus existence of a probabilistic price attaining minimax
regret using results from Reny (1999).
Proposition 4 (Existence of Minimax Regret)
A solution (￿r;Fr) to the saddlepoint condition (SPr) exists.
The minimax regret probabilistic price of the seller has to respond to a set of possible
distributions. With an adversarial nature, the minimax regret policy of the seller is to o⁄er
many prices. We might guess intuitively that even the lowest price o⁄ered by the seller is
not very far away from p0, the optimal price for the model distribution. In consequence,
the price might not be low enough to dissuade nature from ￿undercutting￿ by placing
probability just below the lowest price o⁄ered by the seller. This in turn might suggest
that an equilibrium of the minimax regret pricing game fails to exist, however contradicting
Proposition 4 above. Equilibrium strategies will be established by using the constraints on
the least favorable demand. Naturally, the seller will price close to the optimal price without
uncertainty. A mass point in the pricing strategy of the seller will be placed precisely at the
point where nature is constrained by the neighborhood to shift any additional probability
from above to just below the mass point of the seller. The seller then places the remaining
mass in a neighborhood [a;c] of this mass point b to protect against an increase in regret
through local increases in values near this mass point.
16Proposition 5 (Minimax Regret)
1. Given ￿ > 0; if " is su¢ ciently small, there exist a;b and c with 0 < a < b < c < 1




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if 0 ￿ p < a;
ln
p
a if a ￿ p < b;
1 ￿ ln c
p if b ￿ p ￿ c;
1 if c < p ￿ 1:
2. The boundary points a;b and c respond to an increase in uncertainty at " = 0:
(a) lim"!0 a0 (0) = ￿1;
(b) lim"!0 b0 (0) is ￿nite,
(c) lim"!0 c0 (0) = 1:
We construct a probabilistic price that attains minimax regret by means of the implicit
function theorem, for which we need the di⁄erentiability of the density function near p0.
The least favorable demand makes the seller indi⁄erent among all prices p 2 [a;c]. As
uncertainty increases, the interval over which the seller randomizes increases substantially
in order to protect against nature either undercutting or moving mass to the highest possible
prices. At the same time, the mass point b does not change drastically.
We now illustrate the equilibrium behavior with the uniform model distribution:
F0 (v) = v;
where the pro￿t maximizing price p0 under the model distribution is given by p0 = 1
2: We
graphically represent the optimal behavior of the seller and nature for a small neighborhood.
Insert Figure 2: Pricing and Least Favorable Demand under Minimax Regret
The interior curve in the above graph identi￿es the model distribution. Constraints
induced by small changes in values cause the distribution function of Fr to be within an "
17bandwidth of the model distribution. The large changes of values, occurring with probability
of at most ", move the smallest valuation to the largest valuation, namely 1. The strategy
of nature is then to place as little probability as necessary below the range of the prices
o⁄ered by the seller and to shift values above the range as high as possible. Inside the range
of prices o⁄ered by the seller, nature uses a density function which maintains the virtual
utility of the seller at 0. In turn, the seller sets the density to make nature indi⁄erent
between all values above the mass point and all values below the mass point. Given the
mass point set by the seller, nature shifts as much mass as possible below this point. We
observe that even with the small neighborhood of " = 0:05, the impact of the uncertainty
on the probabilistic price is rather large and leads to a wide spread in the prices o⁄ered by
the seller.
It remains to describe the comparative static of the probabilistic price and the regret
of the seller as a function of the size of the neighborhood. The behavior of regret and
of the expected price to a marginal increase in uncertainty can be explained by the ￿rst
order e⁄ects. For a small level of uncertainty, we may represent the regret through a linear
approximation




where r0 is the regret at the model distribution. For a small level of uncertainty, the marginal
change in regret can then be computed by holding the probabilistic price of the seller at
the optimal price p0 without uncertainty. Suppose then for the moment that p0 ￿ 1
2: If the
uncertainty increases marginally, the constraints on the choice of a least favorable demand
are relaxed. What precisely then can nature do, given the speci￿cation of neighborhood.
First, nature can place the density f0 (p0) slightly below p0 to marginally increase regret
by p0f0 (p0), then nature can shift each value up by " to marginally increase regret by 1
and ￿nally shift mass from 0 to 1 to marginally increase regret by 1 ￿ p0: The ￿rst two
changes correspond to small changes in valuation with large probability, the third to large
changes in the valuation with small probability. So the overall marginal e⁄ect on regret of
an increase in " near " = 0 is p0f0 (p0) + 1 + (1 ￿ p0). If instead the optimal price without
uncertainty were p0 > 1
2, then the robust modi￿cation would only pertain to the third
element as nature would move mass from 0 to just below p0, so that the marginal increase
18would be p0f0 (p0) + 1 + p0.
The optimal response of the seller to an increase in uncertainty is now to ￿nd a proba-





coming from the increase in uncertainty. Of course, the consequence of adjusting the price to
minimize the marginal regret is that it changes the regret relative to the model distribution
F0. Locally, the cost of moving the price away from the optimum is given by the second
derivative of the objective function. With small uncertainty, the curvature of the regret
is identical to the curvature of the pro￿t function. The rate at which the minimax regret
price responses to an increase in uncertainty is then simply the ratio of the response of the









The next proposition shows that the above intuition can be made precise and shows its
implication for the net utility of the buyer.
Proposition 6 (Comparative Statics with Minimax Regret)














2 if p0 > 1
2:
(8)
We observe that for p0 > 1
2, the response of the expected price E[￿r] to an increase in
uncertainty is identical under regret minimization and pro￿t maximization. The di⁄erence
arises at a low level of p0 at which the seller is less aggressive in lowering her price due to
an increase in uncertainty. For the case of p0 ￿ 1
2, it turns out that the expected price can
be strictly increasing in ": In fact, we ￿nd that in the class of linear densities the change
in expected price as well as the change in the mass point is strictly positive if, and only
if, the density is strictly decreasing. This has to be contrasted with the maximin behavior
where any increase in size of the uncertainty has a downward e⁄ect on prices for all model
distributions.
194.2 Menu Pricing
The equilibrium menu policy can be directly derived from the random pricing policy ￿r.
We identify the regret minimizing menu (q;tr (q)) by determining the transfer price of every
o⁄ered quantity q through the random pricing policy ￿r. The resulting net utility for a
buyer with value v is given by:
q ￿ v ￿ tr (q):
Speci￿cally, the construction of the menu (q;tr (q)) proceeds as follows. Every price p 2 R+
of the random pricing policy ￿r such that p 2 supp(￿r), determines a probability q in the
menu by:
q , ￿(p); (9)





By the very construction of the transfer function tr (q), it follows that a buyer with value
v will select the item q on the menu such that q = ￿(v). The self-selection condition for
a buyer with value v is determined by choosing the quantity q, such that the net utility of
the buyer is maximized, or
v ￿ t0
r (q) = 0,
which occurs at q = ￿(v) as t0
r (q) = v by (10). By the taxation principle in the theory
of mechanism design, the menu (q;tr (q)) can also be viewed as an incentive compatible
allocation plan (qr (v);tr (v)) in the corresponding direct mechanism.
The equilibrium use of menus allows us to understand the selling policies from a di⁄erent
and perhaps more intuitive point of view. The optimality of menus emphasizes the concern
for robustness as menus would never be used in the standard setting for a given demand
distribution. The minimax regret menu o⁄ered by seller has three important characteristics.
These properties can be described with reference to the mass point b in the random pricing
policy ￿r of Proposition 5: (i) low volume o⁄ers are made for buyers with low valuations,
or v < b, (ii) a much higher o⁄er is made for all buyers with valuation v = b, and (iii)
even higher volume o⁄ers are made to buyers with large values v > b. We may think of
20a standard o⁄er as given by the quantity o⁄ered at v = b. In addition, the seller o⁄ers
low volume downgrades and high volume upgrades. The expanded menu relative to the
optimal single item menu for the model distribution, seeks to minimize the exposure to
regret. Obviously, the seller loses pro￿ts on the high value buyers from making o⁄ers to
the low value buyers by granting the high value buyers a larger information rent. The size
of the information rent is kept small by o⁄ering menu items to the low value buyers only
of substantially lower volume. This is the source of the gap in the quantities o⁄ered in the
menu.
Insert Figure 3: Menu Pricing Under Minimax Regret
The response of the seller to an increase in uncertainty is informative when we consider
menus. In a menu, the seller is o⁄ering many di⁄erent choices to the buyers. An immediate
question therefore is how the size of the menu and the associated prices change with an
increase in the uncertainty. The size of the menu is simply the range of quantities o⁄ered
by the seller (and accepted by some buyers) in equilibrium.
Proposition 7 (Menus and Uncertainty)
For small uncertainty ":
1. The size of the menu is increasing in ":
2. The price per unit tr (v)=qr (v) is decreasing in " for every v 2 (a;c)nb.
As the uncertainty increases, the seller seeks to minimize her exposure to regret by
o⁄ering more choices to the buyers and hence increasing the probability of a sale, even
if the sale is not ￿big￿ in terms of the sold quantity. For every given valuation v, the
seller also increases the size of the deal o⁄ered. As larger deals are o⁄ered to buyers with
lower valuations, it follows that the seller is willing to concede a larger information rent
to buyers with higher valuations. In consequence, the average price per unit is decreasing
as well. Jointly, these three properties imply that the seller is o⁄ering her products more
aggressively and to a larger number of buyers with an increase in uncertainty. We observe
that the monotonicity in the unit price holds even as the previous proposition showed that
21the expected price may be increasing. The resolution of this apparent con￿ ict comes from
the fact that the seller is o⁄ering larger quantities in response to an increase in uncertainty.
An interesting comparison to a minimax regret decision maker is a risk averse decision
maker. In particular, we could ask how the behavior of a risk averse seller would di⁄er
from the behavior of a minimax regret seller. Clearly, a risk averse seller would never ￿nd
a probabilistic price optimal. However, if she were to be allowed to o⁄er a menu, either of
lotteries (in terms of probabilities of receiving the good) or di⁄erent qualities of the good,
then a risk averse seller might indeed o⁄er a menu. The menu would consist of a set of
possible quantity and price combinations. The di⁄erence with respect to the minimax regret
seller would then be in the shape of the menu. In particular, if a risk averse seller were
to face a continuous demand function (as expressed by F0), then the optimal menu can be
shown to be continuous. Yet, with a minimax regret seller, we saw that the optimal menu is
discontinuous (at a single jump point) and essentially o⁄ers two (or three) classes of distinct
service.
The minimax regret problem with uncertainty then o⁄ers an interesting and novel reason
for menus to complement existing insights. The literature currently o⁄ers two leading
explanations for menus in the standard monopoly setting: menus can be optimal if the
marginal willingness to pay changes with the quantity o⁄ered as in Deneckere and McAfee
(1996) or if the buyers are budget constrained as in Che and Gale (2000).
4.3 Robustness
We conclude this section by showing that the solution to the minimax regret problem also
generates a robust family of policies in the sense of De￿nition 1.
Proposition 8 (Robustness)
If f￿r;"g">0 attains minimax regret at F0 for all su¢ ciently small ", then f￿r;"g">0 is a
robust family of pricing policies.
225 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed pricing policies of a monopolist which are robust to model
uncertainty. The introduction of uncertainty about the true demand distribution formally
lead to a decision theoretic model with multiple priors. The parsimonious representation
of the uncertainty in terms of the neighborhood of a model distribution allowed us to deal
with added complexity and maintain an intuitive understanding of how uncertainty a⁄ects
optimal policies.
We analyzed the optimal pricing of a monopolist under two distinct, but related decision
criteria with multiple priors: maximin pro￿t and minimax regret. We showed that the
solution under either criterion yields a robust solution in the statistical sense. The expected
pro￿t under either pricing rule is arbitrarily close to the optimal price for any distribution in
a su¢ ciently small neighborhood of the model distribution. Despite the common robustness
property, the prices respond di⁄erently to the uncertainty. The maximin policy uniformly
maintains a deterministic price policy and uniformly lowers the price as a response to an
increase in uncertainty. In contrast, the minimax policy balances the downside versus the
upside when responding to the uncertainty. Here the trade-o⁄ is optimally resolved by
a probabilistic price. Importantly, the expected price does not necessarily decrease with
an increase in uncertainty. Interestingly, an equivalent policy to the probabilistic price is
achieved by a menu. The menu o⁄ers a variety of quantities, ranging from small to large, to
the buyer. By o⁄ering a menu, the seller can guarantee himself small deals on the downside
and large deals on the upside. In consequence, the seller hedges to reduce maximal regret
by o⁄ering multiple choices through a menu. A common feature of both models of decision
making is that we can analyze how uncertainty in￿ uences pricing without adding degrees
of freedom to the model. This renders our results parsimonious and falsi￿able.
The problem of optimal monopoly pricing is in many respects the most elementary
mechanism design problem. It would be of interest to extend the insights and apply the
techniques developed here to a wider class of design problems, such as the discriminating
monopolist (as in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984)) and optimal
auctions. The monopoly setting has the simplifying feature that the buyers have complete
23information about their payo⁄environment. Given their known valuation and known price,
each buyer simply has to make a decision as to whether or not to purchase the object. With
the complete information of the buyer, there is no need to look for a robust purchasing rule.
A substantial task would consequently arise by considering multi-agent design problems
with incomplete information such as auctions, where it becomes desirable to simultaneously
make the decisions of the buyers and the seller robust. The complete solution of these
problems poses a rich ￿eld for future research.
246 Appendix
The appendix contains some auxiliary results as well as the proofs for the results in the
main body of the text.
Proof of Proposition 1. As shown in the text, if Fm is such that
Fm (v) = minfF0 (v + ") + ";1g,
then ￿ (p;Fm) ￿ ￿ (p;F) for all F 2 P" (F0): On the other hand, if pm = p￿ (Fm), then
￿ (pm;Fm) ￿ ￿ (p;Fm) holds for all p by the de￿nition of pm: Together this implies that
(pm;Fm) is a saddle point as described in (SPm) and thus pm attains maximin payo⁄ and
Fm is a least favorable demand. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. For su¢ ciently small " our assumptions on F0 imply that Fm is
di⁄erentiable near pm: Since pm is optimal given demand Fm, we ￿nd that pm satis￿es the
associated ￿rst order conditions:
d
dp
(p(1 ￿ Fm (p)))jp=pm = 0:
The earlier strict concavity assumption on ￿ (p;F0) implies that we can apply the implicit
function theorem at " = 0 to the above equation to obtain
dpm
d"
j"=0 = ￿1 +
1 ￿ f0 (p0)
￿2f0 (p0) ￿ p0f0
0 (p0)
=
f0 (p0) + p0f0
0 (p0) + 1




0 (p0) < 0; we observe that the lhs of the above equation as a function
of f0 (p0) is increasing in f0 (p0) and hence by taking the limit as f0 (p0) tends to in￿nity it
follows that this expression is bounded above by ￿1=2. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that for any ￿ > 0, there exists " > 0 such that
F 2 P" (F0) implies ￿ (p￿ (F);F) ￿ ￿ (pm;F) < ￿: Note that ￿ (pm;F) ￿ ￿ (pm;Fm) and
thus
￿ (p￿ (F);F) ￿ ￿ (pm;F) ￿ ￿ (p￿ (F);F) ￿ ￿ (pm;Fm):
Since ￿ (pm;Fm) = ￿ (p￿ (Fm);Fm) the proof is complete once we show that ￿ (p￿ (F);F)
is a continuous function of F with respect to the weak￿ topology. Consider F;G such that
25G 2 P" (F): Using the fact that
G(p) ￿ F (p + ") + ";
we obtain
￿ (p￿ (G);G) ￿ ￿ (p￿ (F) ￿ ";G) = (p￿ (F) ￿ ")(1 ￿ G(p￿ (F) ￿ "))
￿ (p￿ (F) ￿ ")(1 ￿ F (p￿ (F)) ￿ ") ￿ ￿ (p￿ (F);F) ￿ 2":
Since the Prohorov norm is symmetric and thus F 2 P" (G), it follows that
￿ (p￿ (F);F) + 2" ￿ ￿ (p￿ (G);G) ￿ ￿ (p￿ (F);F) ￿ 2";
and hence we have proven that ￿ (p￿ (F);F) is continuous in F. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. We apply Corollary 5.2 in Reny (1999) to show that a saddle
point exists. For this we need to verify that the zero-sum game between the seller and
nature is a compact Hausdor⁄ game for which the mixed extension is both reciprocally
upper semi continuous and payo⁄ secure.
Clearly we have a compact Hausdor⁄ game. Reciprocal upper semi continuity follows
directly as we are investigating a zero-sum game. So all we have to ensure is payo⁄ security.
Payo⁄ security for the monopolist means that we have to show for each (Fr;￿r) with





￿ r(￿r;Fr) + ￿:
Let ￿ , ￿=4 and let ￿ be such that ￿(p) , ￿r (p + ￿): Then using the fact that
F (v) ￿ Fr (v ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ we obtain
Z 1
0















￿ r(￿r;Fr) + ￿:
26To show payo⁄ security for nature we have to show for each (￿r;Fr) with Fr 2 P" (F0) and





￿ r(￿r;Fr) ￿ ￿:
Here we set F , Fr: Given ￿ > 0 consider any ￿ 2 P￿ (￿r). All we have to show is that
￿ (￿;Fr) ￿ ￿ (￿r;Fr) + ￿ for su¢ ciently small ￿: Note that ￿(p) ￿ ￿r (p + ￿) + ￿ implies































in the boundary point ￿, the claim is established. ￿
In order to derive the equilibrium policies in the case of uncertainty we present a char-
acterization of the Prohorov distance in Lemma 1 that builds on the following result of
Strassen (1965).
Theorem (Strassen (1965)).
F and G have Prohorov distance less than or equal to " if and only if there exist random vari-
ables X and Y such that X has distribution F; Y has distribution G and Pr(jY ￿ Xj ￿ ") ￿
1 ￿ ".
The two cumulative distributions F;G are close in terms of the Prohorov distance if and
only if they are associated to two random variables that realize similar values with high
probability. Our characterization describes the Prohorov distance in terms of monotone
functions that are identi￿ed with positive additive measures and cumulative distribution
functions respectively. In order to stay within " distance of a given distribution function G
one may ￿rst alter any value of G(v) at v by at most ", this creates a probability measure
F1, and then move at most " mass of the values. The new locations are described by a
27measure F2 while locations from where the mass has been taken is described by a measure
F3.
Lemma 1 (Decomposition)
Consider " > 0 and probability measures F and G. F 2 P" (G) if and only if there exists a
probability measure F1 and positive additive measures F2 and F3 such that:
G(x ￿ ") ￿ F1 (x) ￿ G(x + ") 8x;
and
F2 (1) = F3 (1) ￿ ";
and
F , F1 + F2 ￿ F3:
Proof. (() Suppose F can be decomposed into F1;F2 and F3. We want to show that
F (A) ￿ G(A") + ". To this purpose, it is clearly su¢ cient to consider only closed sets A.
(a) We ￿rst prove the claim for A = [x;y] with 0 ￿ x ￿ y ￿ 1: Given a probability
measure H; let H￿ (b v) , limv"b v H (v): Then
F1 ([x;y]) = F1 (y) ￿ F￿
1 (x) ￿ G(y + ") ￿ G￿ (x ￿ ") = G([x;y]
"):
Since F2 ([x;y]) ￿ " and F3 ([x;y]) ￿ 0 we obtain:
F ([x;y]) = F1 ([x;y]) + F2 ([x;y]) ￿ F3 ([x;y]) ￿ G([x;y]
") + ":




Using part (a) together with the fact that A" = [x1;y1]
"[[x2;y2]
" holds for the [￿]
" operator,
it follows that:
F1 (A) = F1 ([x1;y1]) + F1 ([x2;y2]) ￿ G([x1;y1]
") + G([x2;y2]
") = G(A"):
Since F2 (A) ￿ " and F3 (A) ￿ 0, the claim is proven.
28(c) The arguments in part (b) are easily generalized for any set A that can be decomposed
into a ￿nite union of disjoint closed intervals of distance greater than 2" so A = [m
k=1 [xk;yk]
with xk ￿ yk < xk+1 ￿ 2" for k ￿ m ￿ 1:
(d) Finally, we show that we do not have to prove the statement for more general sets A.
Notice that if A"
1 = A"
2; A1 ￿ A2 and F (A2) ￿ G(A"
2)+" then F (A1) ￿ G(A"
1)+": So we
can restrict attention to proving the claim for closed sets A such that A" = A"
1 and A ￿ A1
implies A = A1: Consider x;y 2 A such that x < y ￿ x + 2": Then fA [ [x;y]g
" = A" and
hence [x;y] ￿ A: It follows that A belongs to the class of sets investigated in part (c).
()) Consider probability measures F and G with kF ￿ Gk ￿ ": We extend G to
[￿";1 + "] such that G(x) = 0 for ￿" ￿ x < 0 and G(x) = 1 for 1 < x ￿ 1 + ":
Given the result of Strassen (1965), there exist random variables X and Y such that X has
distribution F; Y has distribution G and Pr(jY ￿ Xj ￿ ") ￿ 1 ￿ ".
Let Z1 be the random variable with cdf F1 such that Z1 , X if jY ￿ Xj ￿ " and Z1 , Y
if jY ￿ Xj > ". Let "0 , Pr(jY ￿ Xj > ") so "0 ￿ ": Then G(x ￿ ") ￿ F1 (x) ￿ G(x + "):
Let Z2 be the random variable with cdf b F2 such that Z2 , 0 if jY ￿ Xj ￿ " and Z2 , X if
jY ￿ Xj > ": Let Z3 be the random variable with cdf b F3 such that Z3 , 0 if jY ￿ Xj ￿ "
and Z3 , Y if jY ￿ Xj > ": Then X = Z1 + Z2 ￿ Z3 and b F2 (0); b F3 (0) ￿ 1 ￿ "0: Let
Fi , b Fi￿(1 ￿ "0) for i = 2;3: Then F2 and F3 are positive additive measures with F2;F3 ￿ "0
and the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 5. We start by assuming p0 > 1
2: The proof proceeds in three steps.
First we show the existence of the parameters a; b and c and use these to construct the least
favorable demand Fr: Second, we decompose the least favorable demand by using Lemma
1 to show that it is close to F0: Third, we use this decomposition to verify that we have a
saddle point.
Step 1. We start by showing that for su¢ ciently small "; there exist parameters a;b;c
29such that a < b < c and a < p0 < c such that
F0 (a ￿ ") ￿ " = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
a
; (11)
F0 (b + ") = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
b
; (12)
F0 (c ￿ ") = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
c
: (13)
Concerning the existence of b; note that b = p0 solves (12) if " = 0. As
d
db
(1 ￿ F0 (b + ") ￿ bf0 (b + "))j"=0 = ￿2f (p0) ￿ p0f0
0 (p0) < 0;
due to the strict concavity of pro￿ts at p0, the implicit function theorem implies that a
continuous solution b = b(") to (12) (with b > 0) exists for " in a neighborhood of 0 with
b(0) = p0: To prove existence of c; de￿ne
h" (v) , 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
v
￿ F0 (v ￿ ") for v > 0:
We need to show that there exists c > b such that h" (c) = 0: Note that
h" (b) = F0 (b + ") ￿ F0 (b ￿ ");
and hence h" (b) > 0 for su¢ ciently small " as f (p0) > 0 by assumption in the statement
of the proposition and as f is continuous in a neighborhood of p0: Moreover,
h0
" (b) = f0 (b + ") ￿ f0 (b ￿ ");
h00
" (b) = ￿
2f0 (b + ")
b
￿ f0
0 (b ￿ ") ￿ ￿




In fact, one can easily show for v in a su¢ ciently small neighborhood around p0 that h0
" (v)
is small and that h00
" (v) is bounded below 0. Here one uses the fact that f is assumed
to be continuously di⁄erentiable in the neighborhood of p0. Speci￿cally one shows there
exists ￿ > 0 and a neighborhood of p0 such that if ￿ > 0 and " is su¢ ciently small then
0 < h" (b) < ￿ and h0
" (v) < ￿ and h00
" (v) < ￿￿ for any v in this neighborhood. This means
that h" (v) < ￿ + ￿ (v ￿ b) ￿ ￿ (v ￿ b)
2 for v in this neighborhood. Choosing ￿ su¢ ciently
small, one then shows that for su¢ ciently small " there exists c > b such that h" (c) = 0
where c ! p0 as " ! 0.
30For the existence of a; similar calculations for h" (v) + " show that there exists a < b
such that h" (a) + " = 0 with a ! p0 as " ! 0:
We can describe the local behavior of the parameters a;b and c by appealing to the
implicit function theorem. Since 2f0 (p0) + p0f0
0 (p0) > 0; we know that b is di⁄erentiable
and by implicitly di⁄erentiating (12) we obtain:
b0 (0) = ￿
f0 (p0) + p0f0
0 (p0)




2f0 (p0) + p0f0
0 (p0)
; (14)
with ￿1 < b0 (0) ￿ ￿1=2. The second inequality follows from using the fact that b0 (0) as a
function of f0 (p0) is increasing. Next, we show that a is di⁄erentiable. Since
b2f0 (b + ") ￿ a2f0 (a ￿ ")
b ￿ a
= (b + a)f0 (b + ") + a2f0 (b + ") ￿ f0 (a ￿ ")
b ￿ a
￿ 2p0f0 (p0) + (p0)
2 f0
0 (p0);
we ￿nd that b2f0 (b + ") > a2f0 (a ￿ ") near " = 0. Hence we can implicitly di⁄erentiate
(11) to obtain
a0 (") = ￿a
a + af0 (a ￿ ") + bf0 (b + ")







a0 (") = ￿
1 + 2f0 (p0)
2f0 (p0) + p0f0
0 (p0)
:
In particular, we obtain that
lim
"!0
a0 (") = ￿1: (16)
Similarly for c, we ￿nd that:
c0 (") = ￿c
cf0 (c ￿ ") + bf0 (b + ")















c0 (") = 1: (18)
It now follows from (16) and (18) that a < p0 < c.
31Step 2. We now construct the least favorable demand on the basis of a;b and c.
Consider Fr given by:
Fr (v) ,
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 if v 2 [0;");
maxf0;F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ "g, if v 2 [";a];
1 ￿
b2f0(b+")
v , if v 2 (a;c);
F0 (v ￿ "), if v 2 [c;1);
1; if v = 1:
The de￿nitions of a and c imply that Fr is continuous at a and c. It follows that Fr is a
probability measure.
Next we show that Fr 2 P" (F0) by using Lemma 1. The proof is by construction and




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0, if v 2 [0;");
F0 (v ￿ "), if v 2 [";a];
maxfFr (v);F0 (v ￿ ")g, if v 2 (a;b);
Fr (v); if v 2 [b;1]:
Then F1 is a probability measure with F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ F1 (v) for v 2 [";1]: By de￿nition of b
we obtain Fr (b) = F0 (b + ") and F0
r (b) = d
dvF0 (v + ")jv=b: Moreover, given
F00
r (v) = ￿




dv2F0 (v + ") = f0
0 (v + ");
strict concavity of pro￿ts near p0 implies that F00
0 (v) < F00
r (v) for v 2 [a;c] and " su¢ ciently
small. Thus, for su¢ ciently small "; as a and c are close to p0; we obtain F1 (v) ￿ F0 (v + ")




> > > <
> > > :
0, if v 2 [0;a];
" ￿ maxfF0 (v ￿ ") ￿ Fr (v);0g, if v 2 (a;b];
"; if v 2 (b;1]:




(Fr (v) ￿ F0 (v ￿ ")) =
b2f0 (b + ")
v2 ￿ f0 (v ￿ ") ￿ 0 (19)
holds if v 2 (a;b] and Fr (v) < F0 (v ￿ "). Strict concavity of the pro￿t function near
p = p0 can be used to show that v2f0 (v ￿ ") is increasing in v for su¢ ciently small ": We
establish the inequality (19) for v = x where x 2 (a;b) solves Fr (x) = F0 (x ￿ "). Note that
x(1 ￿ Fr (x)) = b2f0 (b + ") and hence we aim to show that
x(1 ￿ Fr (x)) ￿ x2f0 (x ￿ ") = x(1 ￿ F0 (x ￿ ") ￿ xf0 (x ￿ ")) ￿ 0;
which follows once we show that x < p0. By invoking the implicit function theorem on
Fr (x) ￿ F0 (x ￿ ") = 0, we notice that the derivative with respect to x vanishes as " ! 0
while the terms involving " and b(") combine to yield an expression that tends to 2f0 (p0)
as " ! 0: Thus we ￿nd that the slope of x near " = 0 is unbounded and as x(") < b(") and






0, if v 2 [0;"];
minfF0 (v ￿ ");"g, if v 2 (";1];
and so F3 (v) is an additive measure and F3 (1) = ": Since Fr = F1 + F2 ￿ F3 we obtain
from Lemma 1 that Fr 2 P" (F0):
Step 3. We now show that (￿r;Fr) is a saddle point. For the monopolist we verify
easily that ￿ (p;Fr) = b2f0 (b + ") for p 2 [a;c]: Next we consider pro￿ts nearby but outside











f0 (a ￿ ") <
b2f0 (b + ")
a2 :
Similarly we need to show for the case where p > c that
f0 (c ￿ ") >
b2f0 (b + ")
c2 ;
33which is easily veri￿ed for su¢ ciently small " by using the fact that c0 (0) = 1 while b0 (0)
is ￿nite. Thus we have shown that there exists ￿ > 0 such that
[a;c] = arg max
p2[p0￿￿;p0+￿]
￿ (p;Fr):
In particular, ￿ can be chosen independently of " once " is su¢ ciently small. Upperhemi-
continuity of the set of pro￿t maximizing prices then implies that [a;c] ￿ argmaxp ￿ (p;Fr).
Consider now the incentives of nature. The regret r is an additive function over the
measures and so:
r(￿r;Fr) = r(￿r;F1) + r(￿r;F2) ￿ r(￿r;F3): (20)
We show that nature maximizes each term in (20) and then sets Fr = F1 + F2 ￿ F3;
subject to the constraints on F1; F2 and F3 speci￿ed in Lemma 1. Notice that we assume
that F1 (1) = F2 (1) = ". Consider ￿rst F2: By construction of ￿r, regret r(￿r;￿) is
constant over v 2 [a;b) and over v 2 [b;c]: Since r(￿r;a) < r(￿r;b) and since r(￿r;v) is
monotone increasing on [0;a] and [c;1] it follows that argmaxv r(￿r;v) ￿ [a;b) [ f1g: For
su¢ ciently small "; r(￿r;a) ￿ p0 while r(￿r;1) ￿ 1 ￿ p0 and thus given p0 > 1
2 we obtain
[a;b) = argmaxv r(￿r;v) and thus maxF:F(1)=" r(￿r;F) = r(￿r;F2):
Concerning F3 let v1 = inf fv : F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ "g: We have to show that r(￿r;v0) ￿
r(￿r;v2) for v0 ￿ v1 ￿ v2: Given the above it is su¢ cient to consider only v0 = v1 and
v2 = c where r(￿r;c) = c ￿ E(￿r): Let ￿ , 2supv>0 (v=F0 (v)), then
r(￿r;v1) = v1 ￿ " + ￿F0 (v1 ￿ ") ￿ "(1 + ￿):
On the other hand, we showed in Step 1 that c0 (0) = 1 and in the proof of Proposition 6,
based only on arguments in Step 1, we ￿nd that @
@"E(￿r)j"=0 < 1 so @
@"r(￿r;c)j"=0 = 1.
Hence, r(￿r;v1) < r(￿r;c) for " su¢ ciently small which shows that minF:F(1)=" r(￿r;F) =
r(￿r;F3).
Finally, consider F1: More mass cannot be allocated to regret maximizing values [a;b) as
F1 (b) = F0 (b + "); weight on values below a and above c are shifted up as far as possible as
Fv (v) = F0 (v ￿ ") for v < a and c < v < 1 and allocation of F1 for F1 2 (F1 (b);F0 (c ￿ "))
will not in￿ uence regret as r(￿r;v) is constant on [b;c]: This completes the proof.
34The case of p0 ￿ 1
2 proceeds in an analogous manner. It is easily shown that there exist
parameters a;b;c such that a < b < c and a < p0 < c such that:
F0 (a ￿ ") ￿ " = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
a
;
F0 (b + ") = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
b
+ ";
F0 (c ￿ ") ￿ " = 1 ￿




b0 (0) = ￿
f0 (p0) + p0f0
0 (p0) ￿ 1
2f0 (p0) + p0f0
0 (p0)
= ￿1 +
f0 (p0) + 1
2f0 (p0) + p0f0
0 (p0)
:
The least favorable demand Fr is now given by:
Fr (v) ,
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
maxf0;F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ "g, if v 2 [0;a];
1 ￿
b2f0(b+")
v , if v 2 (a;c);
maxf0;F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ "g, if v 2 [c;1);
1 if v = 1;
decomposed as Fr , F1 + F2 ￿ F3 where we de￿ne the measures F1;F2;F3 as follows:
F1 (v) ,
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
F0 (v ￿ "), if v 2 [0;a];
1 ￿
b2f0(b+")
v + ", if v 2 (a;c);
F0 (v ￿ "); if v 2 [c;1);





0, if v 2 [0;1);
", if v = 1;
and
F3 (v) , minfF0 (v ￿ ");"g; if v 2 [0;1]:
Lemma 1 can be applied to show that Fr 2 P" (F0): In contrast to the previous case of
p0 > 1
2, now v = 1 maximizes r(￿r;v) so that F2 puts all mass at v = 1. ￿











































E[￿r]j"=0 = ￿1 +
f0 (p0) ￿ 1










E[￿r]j"=0 = ￿1 +
f0 (p0) + 1
2f0 (p0) + p0f0
0 (p0)
> ￿1;
which concludes the proof. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. Following Proposition 5, lim"!0 a0 (") = ￿1 and lim"!0 c0 (") =
1 and therefore the size of the menu is increasing in " for " su¢ ciently small which proves
(1). Next we verify (2). Assume a < v < b. Then qr (v) = ln v




so given a0 < 0 for " small we obtain @
@"qr (v) > 0; @






(v ￿ a) 1























Assume b < v < c. Then qr (v) = 1 ￿ ln c
v and






b = E[tr] + v ￿ c;
so @
@"qr (v) < 0; @












c (E[tr] + v ￿ c) ￿
￿




1 ￿ ln c
v
￿2 c0 (") < 0;



















for su¢ ciently small " which proves (2).￿
36Proof of Proposition 8. Assume that ￿r attains minimax regret but is not robust. So
there exists ￿ > 0; such that for all " > 0; there exists F" such that F" 2 P" (F0) but
￿ (p￿ (F");F") ￿ ￿ (￿r;F") ￿ ￿: (21)
Assume that (￿r;Fr) is a saddle point of the regret problem (SPr) given " > 0. Then
￿ (￿r;Fr) = ￿ (p￿ (Fr);Fr):
We can rewrite the left hand side of (21) as follows:
￿ (p￿ (F");F") ￿ ￿ (￿r;F") (22)
= ￿ (p￿ (F");F") ￿ ￿ (p￿ (Fr);Fr) + ￿ (￿r;Fr) ￿ ￿ (￿r;F"):
Using (SPr) we also obtain




vdF" (v) + ￿ (￿r;F") ￿ ￿ (￿r;Fr),
so that:





Entering this into (22) we obtain from (21) that:




vdF" (v) ￿ ￿: (23)
Since F";Fr 2 P" (F0) and since h(v) = v is a continuous function and the Prohorov norm




vdF" (v) < ￿=2; (24)
if " is su¢ ciently small.
In the proof of Proposition 3 we showed that ￿ (p￿ (F);F) as a function of F is contin-
uous with respect to the weak￿ topology. Hence
￿ (p￿ (F");F") ￿ ￿ (p￿ (Fr);Fr) < ￿=2; (25)
if " is su¢ ciently small. Comparing (23) to (24) and (25) yields the desired contradiction.￿
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Figure 1. Maximin Pricing pm and Least Favorable Demand Fm
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Figure 2. Minimax Pricing Φr and Least Favorable Demand Fr
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Figure 3. Minimax Menu Pricing (qr,tr)
Model Distribution F0(v) = v, Neighborhood ε = 0.05